Legislative Inaction and the \u3cem\u3ePatterson\u3c/em\u3e Case by Maltz, Earl M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 4 
1989 
Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case 
Earl M. Maltz 
Rutgers University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Race Commons, Legislation Commons, 
and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Earl M. Maltz, Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case, 87 MICH. L. REV. 858 (1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol87/iss4/5 
 
This Correspondence is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case 
Earl M. Maltz* 
In its October 1988 issue,1 the Michigan Law Review published a 
symposium on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 2 a case in which the 
Supreme Court has requested reargument on the question of whether 
Runyon v. Mccrary 3 should be overruled or modified. 4 Each of the 
three distinguished contributors to the symposium concludes that the 
Court should not overrule Runyon. 5 In reaching this conclusion, Pro-
fessor William N. Eskridge and Professor Daniel A. Farber rely heav-
ily on the view that because Congress has recognized the existence of 
the Runyon doctrine and has refused to overrule the decision, the doc-
trine of stare decisis should apply with particular force. 6 Although 
their analyses significantly advance the debate on the role of precedent 
in statutory interpretation, in my view their conclusions are incorrect. 
One of the difficulties in dealing with Patterson is that more than 
one precedent is actually involved in the case. The order of the Court 
directed the parties only to consider Runyon, a 1976 decision which 
held that 42 U.S.C. section 1981 prohibits private racial discrimination 
in the making of contracts. In Runyon itself, however, the majority 
concluded over strenuous dissent that the case was controlled by the 
1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 7 which had held that 42 
U.S.C. section 1982 prohibited private racial discrimination in the sale 
of property. Thus, if one accepts the doctrine of passive congressional 
acquiescence or reaffirmation generally, any congressional actions 
taken after 1968 might be considered relevant. The two events that 
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A. 1972, Northwestern; J.D. 1975, 
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1. 87 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
2. No. 87-107 (reargument, Oct. 26, 1988). 
3. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
4. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam). 
5. See Aleinikolf, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 65 (1988); Es-
kridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 108 (1988); Farber, Statutory 
Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 19 (1988). 
6. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 121-22; Farber, supra note 5, passim. 
The question of the import of legislative inaction in the face of judicial interpretation of 
statutes has been the subject of substantial scholarly commentary. See sources cited in Eskridge, 
supra note 5, at 68-69 nn.9-10; Farber, supra note 5, at 9 n.33. My own views on the subject may 
be found in Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 388-90 (1988). 
7. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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could conceivably be viewed as expressing congressional approval of 
Runyon are (1) the rejection of the Hruska amendment to the 1972 
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 which would have made 
that Act the exclusive remedy for racial discrimination, and (2) the 
passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 
("Fees Act").9 
Eskridge's perceptive analysis of the rejection of the Hruska 
amendment demonstrates that this action cannot be taken to be a con-
gressional ratification of the Runyon holding in any meaningful 
sense. 10 He argues, however, that the adoption of the Fees Act shows 
"public reliance" on the Runyon Court's interpretation of section 
1981. 11 In fact, the Fees Act is a classic example of the difficulties 
inherent in the concept of congressional reliance on statutory 
precedent. 
Admittedly, when adopting the Fees Act, Congress did act against 
the background assumption - based on Jones and Runyon - tha~ 
section 1981 prohibited private racial discrimination. Indeed, this as-
sumption was explicitly included in the legislative history of the Fees 
Act. 12 Reliance, however, requires more than simple belief in a fact or 
state of affairs; it implies that the relevant belief had some impact on 
the action taken. Put another way, to demonstrate reliance one would 
have to show that Congress' alleged belief that section 1981 covered 
private discrimination influenced the shape of the Fees Act. 
In the context of the Fees Act, any such claim is totally implausi-
ble. The passage of the Fees Act was a direct response to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 13 
in which the Court held that in the absence of a specific statutory man-
date, attorney's fees were not available to prevailing parties in actions 
under federal law. This holding created something of an anomaly in 
federal civil rights law; while attorney's fees were available by statute 
in suits under provisions such as section 1983 and Title VII, no ex-
isting attorney's fees statutes were applicable to a variety of other civil 
rights statutes including (but not limited to) sections 1981 and 1982. 
The purpose of the Fees Act was simply to achieve consistency and to 
provide generally for the award of attorney's fees in all federal civil 
8. 118 CoNG. REc. 3373 (1972) (roll call vote). 
9. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(1982)). 
10. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 100.03. 
11. Id. at 121. 
12. See sources cited id. at 84 n.101. 
13. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
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rights actions. t4 
Given this background, one can hardly infer either reliance on or 
ratification of the Runyon doctrine from the passage of the Fees Act. 
Reconsideration of the proper scope of civil rights legislation was 
neither contemplated nor discussed; instead, Congress was intending 
only to provide for the award of attorney's fees in whatever civil rights 
actions happened to be available by statute. Eskridge's argument on 
public reliance is thus unpersuasive. 
Indeed, the best indications of congressional attitude toward the 
Runyon doctrine point precisely in the opposite direction. To under-
stand this point fully, one must first recognize that Jones itself was an 
abrupt departure from prior law. For nearly a century prior to the 
Jones decision, the Supreme Court had consistently expressed the view 
that sections 1981 and 1982 applied only to discrimination by state 
officials. ts The majority and dissent in Jones differed on the question 
of whether any of the Court's previous pronouncements on the subject 
could properly be viewed as controlling precedent;t6 but however one 
characterizes it, the language of prior decisions unequivocally takes 
the position that the two sections were not intended to reach purely 
private action. 
It was against this background that Congress adopted the original 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act).t7 The 1964 Act was a deli-
cate compromise between factions holding a variety of competing 
views on the civil rights issue and was passed only after a protracted, 
often bitter political struggle. ts It is inconceivable that so much effort 
would have been expended and so much blood shed had Congress be-
lieved that it was simply duplicating the efforts of the drafters of sec-
tions 1981 and 1982. 
Even more importantly, the 1964 Act demonstrated that Congress 
was unwilling to adopt a measure that embodied the Jones and Runyon 
interpretations of sections 1981 and 1982. As adopted, the 1964 Act 
was substantially less sweeping than those interpretations. A similar 
result ensued in 1972, when Congress undertook a thorough review of 
14. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5911-12. 
15. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 
(1926); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 
(1879). 
16. Compare Jones, 392 U.S. at 420-21 n.25, with Jones, 372 U.S. at 450-52 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, §§ 101-1106, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2000e17 (1982)). 
18. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the 1964 Act, see Vass, Title VIL· 
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1965). 
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tQ.e scope of civil rights legislation. Although substantially strengthen-
ing the 1964 Act and declining to directly overrule Jones, Congress 
once again refused to adopt the type of fiat ban on private racial dis-
crimination embodied in Jones and Runyon. 19 
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the present Congress 
would be equally unwilling to adopt such a ban. Ironically, the best 
evidence on this point comes from the amicus curiae brief filed by 66 
Senators and US Representatives in Patterson - a brief urging the 
Court to reaffirm the Runyon doctrine. The brief states that "[t]he 
legislative effort necessary to restore [Runyon] would likely be frac-
tious and divisive, since corrective legislation would, in all likelihood, 
compel the Congress to address numerous peripheral questions con-
cerning the scope and application of Section 1981.'_'2° 
In essence, the members of Congress urge the Court to reaffirm 
Runyon - even if wrongly decided initially- because it would be too 
much trouble for them to legislate on the subject and (in any event) 
they probably could not reenact the Runyon doctrine in its full scope. 
I suppose that, in a sense, the position of the members' brief might be 
characterized as reflecting a desire to rely on Runyon; however, it is 
hardly the kind of reliance that should guide judicial decisionmaking. 
In short, the idea of legislative ratification of or relianc~ on the 
Runyon decision should not influence the Court's disposition of Patter-
son. Of course, the Court might conceivably reaffirm Runyon in any 
event, relying either on the theory that the case was rightly decided 
initially or that other aspects of the doctrine of stare decisis mitigate 
against overruling. While in my view action on either of these grounds 
would be a mistake,21 it would at least not rest on a misconception of 
the import of congressional inaction. 
19. This argument is made in detail in the Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Patterson (No. 87-107) and the Brief for the Equal 
Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Patterson (No. 87-
107). 
20. Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States 
House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Patterson (No. 87-107). 
21. My views on this point may be found in Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Re-
publican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Haus. L. REv. 221, 
247-67 (1987). 
